Abstract. In this paper we extend the ideas for differential fault attacks on the RSA cryptosystem (see [4] ) to schemes using elliptic curves. We present three different types of attacks that can be used to derive information about the secret key if bit errors can be inserted into the elliptic curve computations in a tamper-proof device. The effectiveness of the attacks was proven in a software simulation of the described ideas.
Introduction
Elliptic curves have gained especially much attention in public key cryptography in the last few years. Standards for elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) and signature schemes were developed [7] . The security of ECC is usually based on the (expected) difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem in the group of points on an elliptic curve. In many practical applications of ECC the secret key (the solution to a discrete logarithm problem) is stored inside a tamper-proof device, usually a smart card. It is considered to be impossible to extract the key from the card without destroying the information. For security reasons the decryption or signing process is usually also done inside the card.
Three years ago a new kind of attack on smart card implementations of cryptosystems became public, the so called differential fault attack (DFA) , which has been successful in attacking RSA [4] , DES [3] , and even helps reverse-engineering unknown cryptosystems. The basic idea of DFA is the enforcement of bit errors into the decryption or signing process which is done inside the smart card. Then information on the secret key can leak out of the card. In RSA implementations for example this information can be used to factor the RSA modulus (at least with some non-negligible probability), which is equivalent to computing the secret RSA key. So far there is no method known to extend the ideas of [4] to cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm problem over elliptic curves. In this paper we investigate how DFA techniques can be used to compute the secret key of an ECC smart card implementation. Our attacks can be used for elliptic curves defined over arbitrary finite fields.
We consider the following scenario: a cryptographically strong elliptic curve is publicly known as part of the public key. The secret key d ∈ Z Z is stored inside a tamper-proof device, unreadable for outside users. On input of some point P on the chosen elliptic curve, the device computes and outputs the point d · P . We assume that we have access to the tamper-proof device such that we can compute d · P for arbitrary input points P .
The main common idea behind the attacks in Sect. 4 is the following: by inserting (in the first mentioned attack) or by disturbing the representation of a point by means of a random register fault we enforce the device to apply its point addition resp. multiplication algorithm to a value which is not a point on the given but on some different curve. It is a crucial observation as we will show in Sect. 3 that the result of this computation is a point on the new probably cryptographically less strong curve which can be exploited to compute d. Thus these attacks work by misusing the tamper-proof device to execute its computation steps on group structures not originally intended by the designer of the cryptosystem. Similar ideas have been previously described in [10] where small order subgroups in (Z Z/pZ Z) * are exploited to compute part of the secret key and in [5] for attacks against identification schemes. It is shown in [5] how identification schemes can be used to prove knowledge of logarithms and roots which do not even exist in the subgroup where the cryptosystem should make its computations.
Moreover, we present a DFA-like attack in Sect. 5 which is similar to attacks against RSA in [4] . There so called register faults are used to attack RSA smart card implementations. Register faults are transient faults that affect current data inside a register. All the circuitry is not influenced by these faults and works properly. For a more detailed discussion of that fault model, we refer to [4, Sect. 3] . We use the same fault model and assume that we can enforce random register faults in the decryption or signing process. Incorrect output values caused by random register faults are used to compute possible intermediate values of the computation and parts of the secret key. The intermediate values are not necessarily unique and one has to repeat the attack to get successively all bits of the secret key. The analysis of the probability of non-uniqueness and so of the costs of the computation of the secret key is the technically most complicated part of the analysis in the considered ECC case and cannot be based on the ideas presented in [4] . We sketch it in the appendix.
We know no widespread applications of smart cards for signature generation or decryption where complete points are the output of the used tamper-proof device. Therefore, we consider additionally as a more realistic scenario the situation that the tamper-proof device implements El-Gamal decryption. For El-Gamal decryption we can show that the attacks from Sect. 4.1 and 5 have expected polynomial running time. Furthermore, it is shown that the attack of Sect. 4.2 can be used against El-Gamal decryption and the elliptic curve digital signature scheme in expected subexponential running time.
The fault models of DFA attacks have been criticized for being purely theoretical. In [2] it is argued that a random one-bit error would be more likely to crash the processor of the tamper-proof device or yield an uninformative error than to produce a faulty ciphertext. Instead, glitch attacks which have already been used in the pay-TV hacking community, are presented in [2, 1, 8 ] as a more practical approach for differential fault analysis. The attacker applies a rapid transient in the clock or the power supply of the chip. Due to different delays in various signal paths, this affects only some signals and by varying the parameters of the attack, the CPU can be made to execute a number of wrong instructions. By carefully choosing the timing of the glitch, the attacker can possibly enforce register faults in the decryption or signing process and apply our attacks.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an introduction to the well known theory of elliptic curves. Section 3 examines pseudo-addition, an operation which will play a crucial part in the DFA attacks. Sections 4 and 5 describe three different attacks on ECC systems and show how faults can be used to determine the secret key d. We close with comments on possible countermeasures.
Elliptic Curves
In this section we review several well known facts about elliptic curves. Let K be a finite field of arbitrary characteristic, and let a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 6 ∈ K be elements such that the discriminant of the polynomial given in (1) is not zero (the formula for the discriminant can be found in, e.g., [6] ). Then the group of points E(K) on the elliptic curve E = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 6 ) is given as
where O := (∞, ∞). Pairs of elements of K 2 which satisfy the polynomial equation (1) are denoted as points on E. In the following we use subscripts like P E to show that P is a point on the elliptic curve E. We define the following operation:
As shown in [6] , this operation makes E(K) to an abelian (additive) group with zero element O E . For any positive integer m we define m · P E to be the result of adding P E m − 1 times to itself. A crucial point that we will use in further sections is the fact that the curve coefficient a 6 is not used in any of the addition formulas given above, but follows implicitly from the fact that the point P E is assumed to be on the curve E.
In almost all practical ECC systems the discrete logarithm (DL) problem in the group of points on an elliptic curve is used as a trapdoor one-way function. The DL problem is defined as follows: given an elliptic curve E and two points P E , d · P E on E, compute the minimal positive multiplier d. A cryptographically strong elliptic curve is an elliptic curve such that the discrete logarithm problem in the group of points is expected (up to current knowledge) to be difficult. ECC system implementations should always use cryptographically strong curves.
We will show in the following sections that random register faults can be used to compute information about a secret key d which is stored inside a tamperproof device that computes d · P for some input point P . Thus our scenario becomes applicable if the device is used for the computation of the trapdoor one-way function d · P in a larger protocol. In practice however neither EC signature generation nor EC cryptosystems use tamper-proof devices which output complete points. Consider for example the following EC El-Gamal cryptosystem (without point compression):
Let E be a cryptographically strong elliptic curve. Given a point P ∈ E assume that Q = d · P is the public key and 1 ≤ d < ord(P ) the secret key of some user. For a point R let x(R) denote the x-coordinate. The EC El-Gamal cryptosystem (without point compression) is given as follows:
Encryption
Decryption Input: message m, public key Input: (H, m ), secret key d 
Pseudo-addition and Pseudo-multiplication
Let E be a fixed cryptographically strong elliptic curve defined over a finite field K. We start with the following question: what happens when we use the operation defined in (2) for arbitrary pairs in K 2 instead for points on E? In this section we will answer this question and deduce some properties of this new operation.
Let a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 ∈ K be the coefficients of E with the exception of a 6 . It should be noted that a 6 does not occur in the addition formulas (2) and is therefore not needed. Then it is easy to see that the operation (2) is also welldefined for arbitrary elements in P := K 2 ∪{(∞, ∞)} (assuming that division by zero has the result ∞). For two arbitrary pairs P i ∈ P, i = 1, 2, we denote this operation as pseudo-addition and write P 1 ⊕ P 2 . Pseudo-subtraction is defined as pseudo-addition with the negative point and denoted with P 1 P 2 = P 1 ⊕(−P 2 ). Moreover, for any positive integer n ∈ IN and any pair P 1 ∈ P, we define a pseudo-multiplication n ⊗ P 1 as the result of (· · · ((
where pseudo-addition ⊕ is used exactly n − 1 times.
We present a few facts on the operation ⊕. Testing a few random example pairs in P, it becomes obvious that pseudo-addition ⊕ is in general no longer associative. We can however prove the following weaker results on pseudo-addition.
Theorem 1. Let two elements
Proof. The first assertion of the theorem follows directly from the symmetry of the formulas given in (2), testing all cases for the second assertion is a minor exercise for a computer algebra system.
The discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves is defined after multiplication of a point with a scalar. The following theorem describes a property of pseudomultiplication.
Theorem 2.
Let the number of elements in the field K be q. For at least q 2 +1− 4q elements P ∈ P and all positive integers n, m, pseudo-multiplication satisfies
Proof. Note first that the assertions are trivial for the pair O. Let therefore 6 ) defines an elliptic curve, then obviously P is a point on this curve, and the result of the theorem follows directly from the associativity of point addition. The number of exceptional pairs (x, y) that do not lead to elliptic curves can easily be bounded by 4q since for given coefficients a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 there are only two possibilities for a 6 such that the discriminant becomes zero.
Finally, we examine how a fast multiplication algorithm behaves when used with pseudo-addition instead of ordinary point addition. A direct consequence of Theorem 2 is the following theorem. Remark 1. The crucial idea of pseudo addition is the fact that one of the curve coefficients is not used in the addition formulas. However a different point representation, so called projective coordinates, is also often used in practice. The addition formulas for such representations (see, e.g., [7, A.10.4]) have the same property. Therefore, the ideas presented in this paper can be adapted to other point representations typically used in practical applications.
Theorem 3. Given a pair P = (x, y) ∈ P and a positive integer

Faults at the Beginning of the Multiplication
We start with the description of elliptic curve fault attacks. The first type of attacks however does not need the generation of any fault; it is an attack on "bad" implementations of ECC systems.
No Correctness Check for Input Points
The first attack is applicable when the device neither explicitly checks whether an input point P nor the result of the computation really is a point on the cryptographically strong elliptic curve E which is a parameter of the system. The attack is simple and should not be applicable to a well designed system, but nevertheless such a "bug" might happen in practice.
Let E = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 6 ) be a given cryptographically strong elliptic curve, which is part of the setup of the ECC system. In this situation we input a pair P ∈ P into the tamper-proof device which is not a point on E, but a point on some other elliptic curve E . We choose the input pair P = (x, y) carefully, such that with a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 6 ) defines an elliptic curve E whose order has a small divisor r and such that ord(P ) = r. With Theorem 3 we know that the output of the tamper-proof device with input P is then d · P on E . Therefore, we end up with a discrete logarithm problem in the subgroup of order r generated by P ∈ E , namely given points P, d · P on E , find d mod ord(P ). We can repeat this procedure with a different choice of P and use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to compute the correct value of d.
This algorithm is quite efficient if we do not choose P , but the curve E first and compute P . The construction of such an elliptic curve E can be done in essentially the same way as in the elliptic curve construction method described in [7] . First we try to find an integer m in the Hasse interval such that (q + 1 − m)
2 − 4q has a large square factor and m a small factor. Then we can determine the j-invariant of an elliptic curve defined over K which has group order m. Finally, we have to check whether there exists an elliptic curve with coefficients a 1 , . . . , a 4 , a 6 that has the given j-invariant. The latter test can be solved by factoring a polynomial of degree 2 and yields a 6 . We check for a few random values of x whether y 2 + a 1 xy + a 3 y − x 3 − a 2 x 2 − a 4 x − a 6 = 0 is solvable for y. The pair P E = (x, y) is chosen as input. Since m has a small divisor, given d · P E we can then determine the secret key modulo this small divisor (at least when this small divisor divides the order of P E on E ).
If we apply this attack to the device computing the El-Gamal decryption as described in Sect. 2 we cannot determine the y-coordinate of the resulting point uniquely. Given its x-coordinate w we can compute values z, z such that (w, z), (w, z ) ∈ E and (w, z 1 ) = −(w, z 2 ), but we cannot decide which of these points is d · P on E . By computation of the discrete logarithms of (w,
Placing Register Faults Properly
In the second attack we assume that we can enforce register faults inside the "tamper-proof" device at some precise moment at the beginning of the multiplication process. If the "tamper-proof" device checks whether the given input point is a point in the group of points of the cryptographically strong elliptic curve E, the attack of Sect. 4.1 is no more applicable. Assume however that we can produce one register fault inside the tamper-proof device right after this test is finished. Then the device computes internally with a pair P which differs in exactly one bit from the input point P . Therefore, the device computes andif it does not check whether the output is a point on E -outputs d ⊗ P . With Theorem 3 we deduce that d ⊗ P lies on the same elliptic curve E as P . We determine a 6 such that the output pair d ⊗ P satisfies the curve equation with coefficients ( a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 6 ). If these coefficients define an elliptic curve E , we have reduced the original DL problem on E to a DL problem on E : check for all possible candidates P (P is unknown outside the device, but remember that P differs in only one bit from the known point P ) whether this candidate is a point on E and -if so -try to solve the DL problem on E . First, we compute ord(E ) the number of points on E using algorithms for point counting. If ord(E ) has a small divisor r, we solve the DL problem for the points (ord(E )/r) · P E and d · ((ord(E )/r) · P E ). This gives an equation d ≡ c mod r for some value c. Repeating this step with different divisors r we can compute d with the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
As described in Sect. 2, we can consider El-Gamal decryption as a black box that on input of some point P computes x(d · P ) where d is the secret key stored inside the tamper-proof device. Note however that we cannot apply directly the attack from this section since we do not know the y-coordinate of the output point. Without the y-coordinate we cannot determine the curve E to which the output P belongs. In general there are many possible curves. It is however possible to solve the DL problem with non-negligible probability if there exists a curve E corresponding to a base point P resulting from a one-bit error such that the order of E is smooth. Then we use the algorithm of Pohlig-Hellman (see [12] ) to compute d.
Similar to the analysis of Lenstra's Elliptic Curve Factoring Method [9] , it follows that we have to consider subexponentially many random elliptic curves until one of them has (subexponentially) smooth order. Thus the expected number of trials of the attack with random points P ∈ E until we find such a smooth curve and can determine the secret multiplier d is subexponential again.
A similar situation occurs in the elliptic curve DSA signature scheme. In EC DSA, we have two primes p, q which are about the same size, an elliptic curve E over IF q , and a point P on E of order p. The public key is (p, q, E, P, Q) where Q = d · P for some secret value d. To sign a message m with hash value h, the signer randomly chooses an integer 1 < k < p − 1, computes k · P = (x 1 , y 1 ), r ≡ x 1 mod p, and
The signature is (r, s). Please note that we cannot input a point here but a publicly known point P is used as base point for the computation. We again disturb the computation of k · P by a register fault right at the beginning, i.e. P is replaced by some P . The tamper-proof device then computes the signature r ≡ x(k · P ) mod p, and s ≡ k −1 (h + dr ) mod p. Knowing this signature, we can use the following algorithm for all possible candidatesP for P : -compute the curveẼ corresponding toP -if it exists -, -derive from r a small set of possible values for the x-coordinate of x(k · P ) (since p, q are of about the same size), -compute two candidates for the corresponding y-coordinate by means of the equation forẼ.
In caseP was correctly chosen andẼ is a weak curve with respect to the discrete logarithm problem and ord(P ) > p − 1, one can first find k, and then the secret
If we disturb the base point P in such a way that P and P differ only in one bit, we have only 2 log(q) possible choices for the curve E and it is very unlikely that we get a curve with subexponentially smooth order and that the attack succeeds. But if we manage to change o(log(q)) many bits at once such that we get subexponentially many different choices for E then there is with high probability at least one curve with smooth order among them and we can compute the one-time key k and so the secret key d, i.e. the signature scheme is completely broken. The expected number of trials to get such a curve E is subexponential again.
Faults at Random Moments of the Multiplication
In this section we sketch an attack that works even if we cannot influence the exact position in the computation process, at which the enforced random register fault happens.
In [4] , the authors show how to attack RSA smart card implementations by enforcing register faults at random time in the decryption or signing process. The most important operation in RSA is fast exponentiation. For elliptic curves, the situation is similar and we can use some of the ideas of [4] .
In the following we assume that the used elliptic curve is cryptographically strong, especially we assume that E(IF q ) contains a subgroup of prime order p with p > q/ log(q). The operation Q = d · P is usually done with either a "right-to-left" or a "left-to-right" multiplication algorithm. Since the ideas for the attacks in both cases are very similar we restrict ourselves here to the "rightto-left" multiplication algorithm and show: if one can enforce a fault randomly in a register at a random state of the computation than one can recover the secret key in expected polynomial time.
We start with a result for a fault model where we can introduce register faults during the computation of an a-priory chosen specific block of multiplier bits, e.g. we assume that we can repeatedly input some point P E on E into the tamperproof device and enforce a register fault during m successive iterations of the fast multiplication algorithm. Then we will show that we can relax this condition, i.e. even if one cannot influence at which block the register fault happens one can deduce the secret key after an expected number of polynomially many enforced random register faults. We will present a rather informal description of the attack which abstracts from some less important details.
The right-to-left multiplication algorithm works as follows (we denote by To simplify the notation assume that we know the binary length n of the unknown multiplier d (note that an attacker can "guess" the length of d). Denote by Q (i) , H (i) the value stored in the variable Q, H in the algorithm description before iteration i.
The basic attack operation works as follows: we use the tamper-proof device with some input point P E to get the correct result Q (n) = d · P E and moreover we restart it with input P E but enforce a random register fault to get a faulty resultQ (n) . Assume that we enforce the register fault in iteration n−m ≤ j < n, and that this fault flips one bit in a register holding the variable Q (the case that a bit in H is flipped can be handled similarly). ThenQ (j) is a disturbed Q-value, i.e. a pair in P 2 that differs in exactly one bit from Q (j) .
Next we try to find the index of the first iteration j with j > j and d j = 1 given Q (n) andQ (n) . For simplicity reasons we assume that there is at least one non-zero bit among the m most significant bits of d, i.e. j exists (we omit the technically more difficult case of m zero bits here for reasons of readability). We can find a candidate for the disturbed Q-valueQ (j ) with the following method: successively, we check each i with n − m ≤ i < n as candidate for j , each x ∈ {0, 1} n−i with least significant bit 1 as candidate for the i most significant bits of d, and each Q
. For each choice of x and i we consider all disturbed Q-valuesQ
x which we can derive from Q (i)
x by flipping one bit. Then we check whether this may be the disturbed value which appeared in the device, i.e. we simulate the computation of the device, compute the corresponding result value and check whether it is identical with the found valueQ (n) . More precisely: we use pseudo-additions with points x 2 i+ ·P E for = 0, . . . , n − i − 1 where x = (x n−i−1 . . . x 0 ) 2 with x 0 = 1 is the binary representation of x to get for candidates i, x, Q
x the corresponding faulty result
x is equal to the faulty resultQ (n) output by the device, then we have found i as a candidate for j ,Q (i)
x as a candidate forQ (j ) , and the binary representation of x as a candidate for the upper n − j bits of d.
By trying faults on Q and on H and all m possibilities for i and corresponding integers x we can make sure that this procedure outputs at least one candidate forQ (j ) (or forH (j) , in the case the fault occurs in H). In case there is only one candidate suitable for P E , Q (n) , m, and forQ (n) we have computed the n − j upper bits of the secret key d. One can show that the probability is small that more than one candidate survives (more details can be found in the appendix).
To reveal step by step all bits of d we start to compute the most significant bits as explained above and work downwards to the least significant bits by iterating the same procedure with new random register faults in blocks of at most m iterations. In each step we use the information that we already know about d to restrict the range of test integers x which have to be considered. Finally, we consider the more general situation in which we cannot induce register faults in small blocks, but only at random moments during the multiplication. As in [4] one can show that for a large enough number of disturbed computations we get a reasonable probability that errors happen in each block of m iterations.
Theorem 5.
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a finite field with q elements, let m = o(log log log q), and let n be the binary length of the secret multiplier. Given = O((n/m) log(n)) faults, the secret key can be extracted from a device implementing the "right-to-left" multiplication algorithm in expected O(n 2 m (log q) 3 log(n)) bit operations.
Thus this theorem can be summarized as follows: if we consider the size of the used finite field as a constant then we need O(n log(n)) accesses to the tamperproof device to compute in O(n log(n)) bit operations the secret key of bit length n. Please notice that the block size m we used as parameter of our algorithm reflects the tradeoff between the number of necessary register faults and the running time to analyse the output values influenced by these faults. It depends on the attackers situation whether more accesses to the tamper-proof device or more time for the analysis can be spent.
Remark 2.
We have implemented a software simulation of the algorithm given above and attacked several hundred randomly chosen elliptic curves. Obviously, one can find easily non-unique solutions for the indices j and the parts of x of the corresponding discrete logarithms if the order of the base point P E is small in comparison with 2 m where m is the length of the block containing the error. Also, if the size of the field is very small (< 1000) the algorithm often finds contradicting solutions. Both cases are not relevant for a cryptographically strong elliptic curve. In all tested examples with size of the field bigger than 2 64 , randomly chosen curve, and random point on the curve we determined the complete secret multiplier d without problems.
If we apply this attack to the device computing the El-Gamal decryption as described in Sect. 2 we cannot determine the y-coordinate of the resulting point uniquely. Since we know the equation of the curve we can compute points Q and −Q such that the correct result Q (n) of the device is one of these points. We start the described attack on both points Q and −Q and compare only the x-coordinate of the disturbed results of the attack with the x-coordinate of the faulty result x(Q (n) ) of the device. Using this procedure we find at least one candidate for some pointQ (j) (or for some pointH (j) , in the case the fault occurs in H) and can determine the upper bits of the secret multiplier d if the candidate is unique.
Countermeasures
It became obvious in the preceding sections that DFA techniques for elliptic curves depend mainly on the ability to disturb a point on E to "leave" the group of points and become an ordinary pair in P. Countermeasures against all attacks presented in this paper are therefore obvious. Although it is part of the protocols of most cryptosystems based on elliptic curves to check whether input points indeed belong to a given cryptographically strong elliptic curve it follows from the described attacks that it is even more important for the tamper-proof device to check the output point or any point which serves as basis for the computation of some output values. If any of these points, input points or computed points, do not satisfy this condition, no output is allowed to leave the device. This countermeasure for ECC is similar to the countermeasures proposed against DFA for RSA where the consistency of the output also has to be checked by the device. Appendix: Success Probability of the Attack in Sect. 5
We denote by Q (i) resp. H (i) the value stored in the variable Q resp. H before iteration i of the right-to-left multiplication algorithm described in Sect. 5. We know also the correct result Q (n) = d · P E and a faulty resultQ (n) for a given base point P E on E.
We define a disturbed Q-value with respect to P E , Q (n) , m to be a pair in P 2 that differs in exactly one bit from some Q (i) for n − m ≤ i ≤ n. Assume that we enforce a register fault in iteration n − m ≤ j < n, and that this fault flips one bit in a register holding the variable Q. Denote byQ (j) the resulting disturbed Q-value. According to the right-to-left multiplication algorithm we try all possible indices n − m ≤ i < n and all integers x with exactly n − i bits (least significant bit 1) to compute candidatesQ
x for disturbed Q-values that lead to the faulty resultQ (n) . The second place where a register fault can happen is the register holding the variable H in the algorithm. The procedure for this case is quite similar. Again, we try all possible indices n − m ≤ i < n and all integers x of exactly n − i bits (least significant bit 1). If the fault is now introduced in the variable H (i.e. into one of the points H (i) = 2 i · P E ), this results in some disturbed H-valueH (i) and is then propagated by the loop of the algorithm. By trying both Q-and H-case and all m possibilities for i and corresponding integers x we can make sure that this procedure outputs at least one candidate forQ (j) or forH (j) . In case there is only one candidate suitable for P E , Q (n) , m and forQ (n) we call this candidate a uniquely determined disturbed value with respect to P E , Q (n) , m. Otherwise, a candidate is called non-uniquely determined disturbed value.
In Lemma 2 we will prove that for m = o(log log log q), all d and almost all points P E there are at most three different non-uniquely disturbed values. Thus the expected number of necessary repetitions of attacks (i.e. choosing a point a rational function, introducing new variables for the faults r 2 , r 4 and using the representation of P 2 , P 4 
Therefore, the total number of possibilities for X 1 and the number of possible points P E is at most O((log log q)(log q) 5 ). The number of points P E for the other cases can be analyzed analogously. Proof. Since E(IF q ) is cryptographically strong, it contains a subgroup of prime order p with p > q log q . Using the Hasse theorem it follows from the previous lemma that we will get a point P E with probability 1 − c(log log q)(log q) 5 /q (for some constant c) of order at least p and for which there exists at most three different non-uniquely determined disturbed values with respect to P E , Q (n) , m. Since at least all H (i) for i = n − m, . . . , n are different and consist of 2 log q bits, there are O(m log q) bit positions in the computation process which could be disturbed. Since there are less than four non-uniquely determined disturbed values for P E the probability to disturb the computation in a way which will lead to one of these non-uniquely determined disturbed values is bounded by 3/(m log q). It follows that with probability more than 1/2 each attack will lead to a uniquely determined disturbed value. Proof. For a running time analysis we note that the number of fault positions is at most 4 log q in each iteration (there are at most 2 points that can be disturbed, the x-and y-coordinate of each point have at most log q bits). For each of the 2 m+1 different integers x we have at most m pseudo-additions which can be done in O(m(log q) 2 ) bit operations each. In addition we have to compute for all indices n − m ≤ j < n the corresponding values Q (j) and H (j) which can be done in O((log q)
3 ) bit operations. We learn all m most significant bits of d if the error changes the value H (n−m) . The probability that a random error during the last m iterations disturbs a bit of H (n−m) is 1 2m . Therefore, we can lower bound the probability of success if we have k independent randomly disturbed results by 1 − (1 − 
